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Abstract: In the tax compliance literature, we observe a lack of empirical evidence on the degree of
tax morale in developing countries. Thus, our paper as a novelty focuses on Latin America, analysing
tax morale as dependent variable and searching for factors that systematically affect tax morale,
working with the two data sets Latinobarómetro and World Values Survey. Our findings indicate that
there is a significant correlation between tax morale and the size of shadow economy. Furthermore,
people who said they knew/have heard about practised tax avoidance have a significant lower tax
morale than others. Looking at individuals’ perception of reasons for tax evasion we found that the tax
burden, lacking honesty, and corruption are seen as the main factors. We observed a significantly
lower tax morale in South America/Mexico than in the Central America/Caribbean area. Furthermore,
trust in the president and the officials, the belief that other individuals obey the law and a pro
democratic attitude have a significant positive effect on tax morale.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Tax morale and tax compliance are important factors for guaranteeing an adequate provision
of public goods. Especially in times when the costs of running public office have strongly
increased, governments search for strategies to generate revenues. A high degree of tax
evasion creates misallocations in resource use (see Alm and Martinez-Vazquez 2001). In
developing countries tax evasion is often widespread (see, e.g., de Soto 2000). Such  a high
level of tax evasion reduces government’s ability to work and thus to provide adequate
services. Over the last decades, developing countries as, e.g., in Latin America have made
considerable efforts to implement major reforms in tax policies and to improve the
effectiveness of their tax administrations:
“These efforts frequently took place under unfavourable macroeconomic circumstances. Tax
administrators often had to cope with a barrage of tax reforms, interspersed with numerous ad
hoc changes in tax rates, exemptions, and payment periods introduced largely for revenue
reasons” (Casanegra de Jantscher and Bird 1995, pp. 1-2).
In general, the empirical evidence in the tax compliance literature is rare. Pyle (1993) points
out in a survey:
The solution should lie in the results of empirical studies. Alas, the current harvest of such
studies is remarkably thin (p. 73).
However, it is interesting to notice that there is hardly any empirical evidence about the
degree of tax morale in developing countries. Thus, the focus on Latin America in this paper
is novel. We analyse tax morale as a dependent variable and search for factors that
systematically affect tax morale. It is important to analyse the determinants that influence tax
morale in developing countries as the environment is different from developed countries. On
the other hand, if we observe similar tendencies, some effects might be independent of
cultural environments. To get a robust picture we are going to analyse two different data sets:
the World Values Survey (WVS) and the Latinobarómetro. The WVS covers the years from
1981 to 1997 and the Latinobarómetro the year 19981. In Section II we are going to give an
overview about the tax system and tax administration in Latin America. Section III starts with
a descriptive analysis evaluating the degree of tax morale in different Latin American
3countries and checking if there is a correlation between tax morale, tax avoidance and the size
of shadow economy.  In a second step, multiple regressions will be estimated pooling together
developing countries in a cross-section analysis, and differentiating between Middle and
South America. The paper finishes with some concluding remarks.
II. TAX POLICY: THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE RATHER THAN THE
PURSUIT OF THE OPTIMAL
Taxation in developing countries is a challenging topic and has attracted increasing attention
in the last two decades. Many problems observed as, for example, poor administration
performances failing to collect sufficient tax revenues, tax structures where tax horizontal and
vertical equity considerations are not integrated, lack of government and economic stability.
Compared to OECD countries, the levels of tax revenues in percent of the GDP are much
lower (around 18 percent compared to around 40 in OECD countries, see, e.g., Tanzi and Zee
(2000, p. 303). We are going to pay attention to the tax administration as it plays an essential
role in the tax policy, especially in those countries in which formal institutions are less stable
and credible. In many developing countries we observe a low capacity of the tax
administration to monitor compliance among taxpayers. Tanzi (2000) reports a case in Peru
where corruption in the tax administration was so common that the government had to close
down the existing administration to replace it completely. In many countries there was a very
high demand for poorly paid jobs in the tax administration, which indicates that applicants
were aware of the possibility to get extra incomes. Furthermore, in some countries these jobs
can be bought (see also Tanzi 2000).
Most countries traditionally have not a self-filling procedure but  employed
deductions. Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (1992) criticised that developing countries have
imitated the complex tax structures of developed countries with the disadvantage of lower tax
administration capabilities. Tax reforms in the 80s had the intention to increase the stability in
the revenue system. The 90s fiscal crises might have been motivating factors for reforms (see
Das-Gupta and Mookherjee 1995). Jenkins (1995) points out that the income tax has
performed very badly in Latin America, tending to give modest amounts of revenue. In
general,  it can be argued that an important aim of a tax reform is to find a good way to raise
revenues, promoting equity and efficiency without crowding out tax morale.
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 Table A1 in the Appendix presents the years when the surveys have been carried out.
4We can also observe a fiscal decentralisation process in the 80s, delegating functions
downwards but without increasing much the local fiscal autonomy. Aghón and Casas (1999)
give an overview on fiscal decentralisation in Latin America. They point out that countries as
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Chile have a limited participation at the subnational
governmental level with a strong dependency on intergovernmental transfers. On the other
hand, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Ecuador and Central America have the tendency to a higher
revenue and expenditure centralisation. Looking at the distribution of revenues by source and
government level, we observe, e.g., in Argentina (1995) that property taxes and indirect taxes
play an essential role for municipalities and provinces. Income taxes on the other hand
covered only around 11 percent of the consolidation of tax revenues (see Rezk 1999).  A
similar picture can be observed in other Latin American countries. Personal income tax
revenues are very low in an international comparison (around 1 percent of the GDP, OECD
countries around 11 percent), and have been constant over the last two decades (see, e.g.,
Tanzi and Zee 2000). However, in Brazil, the income tax assignment is divided between the
union (33.3 percent revenue disposition), the states (24.5 %) and the municipalities (22.5%)
(Rezk 1999, p. 112). Characteristics as, for example, a large agriculture sector, a high degree
of shadow economy, small establishments, and a small proportion of wage income according
to Tanzi and Zee (2000) reduce the possibility for developing countries to rely on modern
taxes, such as personal income taxes (see also, Burgess and Stern 1993). The uneven income
distribution with the political and financial power concentrated in the top prevent modern tax
reforms as the use of personal income or property taxes. Thus, it is not surprising that radical
reforms can hardly be seen in such countries.
Latin American countries generally have their expenditures much more centralised
than OECD countries. On the revenue side, national legislators set tax bases and tax rates.
However, Aghón and Casas (1999) state that in the last years local taxes gained importance
and local governments act mostly as tax collectors.
In 1991 important reforms were enacted in Peru creating an increase in revenues
measured as a percentage of the GDP. The tax administration (Superintendencia Nacional de
Administración Tributaria) reduced their workforce implementing higher standards and
increased the salary to be competitive with the private sector (	

In Bolivia at the end of 80s, tax receipts increased rapidly. Strong changes in the tax
system and the tax administration have been done. Silvani and Radano (1992) analyse Bolivia
and Uruguay. In both countries changes supported by international organisations have been
done between 1985 and 1990. A main intention was to simplify the tax system, taxation and
5auditing procedures. Uruguay’s changes were more gruadual and thus less radical than in
Bolivia, where new taxes were introduced and the fines adapted (from 50 percent to 100
percent of the unpaid taxes). Cabezas (1992) points out that drastic and sweeping changes
have been necessary as the situation was chaotic before 1985. Tax area reforms have been
done hand in hand with government changes. The Bolivia economy was restricted by strong
government regulations and the public sector produced enormous fiscal deficits. The reforms
tried to increase tax collection, to simplify the tax system, and to reduce tax evasion (Cabezas
1992). They eliminated the business income tax and replaced it by a net wealth tax. A further
objective was to avoid contact between taxpayers and administrators. It can be criticised that
such a strategy might not be so efficient. Certainly, the objective was to reduce a discretionary
and arbitrary  behaviour of the tax administration. Corruption in the tax administration is a
real problem in developing countries. There are many opportunities for a tax official to
demand bribes. The effective tax burden might therefore be much higher than the official tax
burden, e.g., due to the “special payments” to the tax officials. Tanzi (2000) offers a set of
arguments why corruption is likely to be a major problem in tax administrations (p. 113):
“1. the laws are difficult to understand and can be interpreted differently so that taxpayers
need assistance in complying with them;
2. the payment of taxes requires frequent contacts between taxpayers and tax administrators;
3. the wages of the tax administrators are low;
4. acts of corruption on the part of the tax administrators are ignored, not easily discovered or,
when discovered, are penalized only mildly;
5. the administrative procedures (for example, the criteria for the selection of taxpayers for
audits) lack transparency and are not closely monitored within the tax or customs
administrations;
6. tax administrators have discretion over important decisions, such as those related to the
provision of tax incentives, determination of tax liabilities, selection of audits, litigations, and
so on; and
7. more broadly, when the controls of the state (the principal) over the agents charged with
carrying out its functions are weak”.
It might be more important that tax administration procedures in the contact with taxpayers
are transparent and clear than to search for strategies to avoid contact with them. Feld and
Frey (2002a) points out
6“If they treat taxpayers as partners in a psychological tax contract, instead of inferiors in a
hierarchical relationship, taxpayers have incentives to pay taxes honestly” (p. 5).
Research findings indicate that a personal interaction between taxpayers and the tax
administration is a key determinant regarding the degree of tax evasion. Feld and Frey
(2002a) show empirically that taxpayers’ honesty and tax morale is enhanced when tax
officials treat them with respect. Thus, it might be more convenient to reduce corruption by
imposing, for example, a periodical geographical mobility on civil servants, removing them
from regions with close social or family relationships (see Tanzi 2000). Such a strategy can
especially be used in large countries (for example in South America). The privatisation of the
revenue collection might be an alternative strategy, done in Indonesia in 1985 where a
customs assessment has been made by a foreign firm, or in Mexico where commercial banks
collect domestic taxes (see Burgess and Stern 1993).
In Chile tax administration has been confronted with strong modernisation tendencies.
Resources have been invested in education courses for the administration staff. Transparency
has been increased informing via internet about the tax system (see 	

In Guatemala in 1987 a tax reform created a dramatic increase of tax evasion. The
government had missed the possibility to reform the tax administration and the changes in the
tax base enhanced the incentives to avoid taxes, increasing the number of exemptions and
deductions. Whereas the revenues increased from 1986 to 1988 (from 8.9 percent to 10.1
percent of the GDP), they fell back in the following years (in 1990, 6.5 percent of the GDP)
(Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 1992). Results indicate that the reform has produced only short-
run effects. According to Pineada (1992, p. 116), less than 1 percent of the registered
businesses were audited (200 out of 30’000) and in the years 1966-67, only 51 percent of the
registered businesses (24’300) paid taxes.
Colombia reformed the tax administration in 1974. However, no increase in the tax
revenues was achieved before the reforms in the late 80s which integrated tax system reforms
as, e.g., tax simplification (	
 
 McLure and Pardo (1992) stress the positive
effects of reforms on tax morale:
“Colombia has one of the best income taxes of any developing country ... Reforms … in
processing collections and refunds – have led to an improvement of taxpayer morale – at least,
the morale of honest taxpayers. Rather than facing the prospect of dealing with dishonest
officials who will demand bribes or otherwise cause trouble for the taxpayer … the taxpayer
can be relatively confident that payments will be handled properly” (pp. 124, 135).
7However, too many reforms can produce instability in the tax system. In Mexico reforms took
place in 1978-80, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990-91, 1993, 1994, 1995-97, and 1998
(Martinez-Vazquez 2001, p. 29). Martinez-Vazquez (2001) points out that instability of the
tax system makes tax enforcement more difficult and might lead to a lower tax revenue.
Changes demand too much of the tax administration, create uncertainty and confusion among
taxpayers and increase tax compliance costs. Contrary to other Latin American countries
Mexico has a very modern tax revenue structure based on income taxes as the most important
source of revenue (31 percent of total federal revenues in 1998). However, the structure is
very centralised, leaving the subnational government only 6 percent of the government
revenues (Martinez-Vazquez 2001, p. 9)
III. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
In our analysis we are going to use two data sets: the World Values Survey and the
Latinobarómetro. The Latinobarómetro has been conducted annually from 1997 to 2000 in
seventeen countries covering most of Latin America with the exception of Cuba, the
Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico. In the survey of 1998 which we take as the basis of our
analysis, tax compliance questions have been asked.  The World Values Survey data covers
10 Latin American countries, and for some of them we have data from different years. Both
data sets help get a relatively robust picture of the degree of tax morale and the determinants
that shape tax morale in Latin America. To reduce possible bias in cross-country analysis, it
makes sense to consider a relatively homogeneous region with similar characteristics.
1. Descriptive Analysis
1. Tax Morale and Tax Evasion
In the World Values Survey the general question for assessing the level of tax morale in a
society in the World Values Survey is:
8Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be
justified, never be justified, or something in between: (…) Cheating on tax if you have the
chance (% “never justified” – code 1 from a ten-point scale where 1=never and 10=always).
Table 1  in the columns 2, 3 and 4 shows for each country the percentage of individuals
saying that tax evasion is never justifiable. Columns 5, 6, and 7 give the mean value for all
countries based on a scale from 0 to 3, were 3 is the highest tax morale (value 0 integrates the
values 4 to 10). It is difficult to get a clear idea about the development of tax morale over
time, as only few countries have participated in the first two World Values Survey waves.
Table 1
Tax Morale Over Time (World Values Survey)
 Tax Evasion Is Never Justifiable (%) Mean  
country 1981-1984 1990-1993 1995-1997 1981-1984 1990-1993 1995-1997
Argentina 64.4 80.5 72.1 2.136 2.563 2.314
Brazil 60.8 46.8 2.006 1.608
Chile 75.7 64.2 2.442 2.180
Colombia 72.2 2.382
Dominican Republic 70.4 2.399
Mexico 48.9 37.3 54.7 1.375 1.453 1.844
Peru 62.7 2.202
Puerto Rico 74.4 2.369
Uruguay 80.3 2.512
Venezuela 70.6 2.417
Average 56.7 63.6 66.8 1.756 2.116 2.223
Notes: Own calculations from the World Values Surveys. Columns 2, 3, and 4: percentage of
individuals saying that tax evasion is “never justified”. Columns 5, 6, 7: mean of the degree of tax
morale, scale from 0 to 3, where 3 means the highest tax morale.
Three out of four countries have a lower tax morale in the years 1995-1997 compared to
1991-1993. Only in Mexico tax morale has increased having been at a very low level in 1991-
1993 and in 1981-1984. The low tax morale in Mexico corresponds to the low revenue
performance (also compared to other developing countries), despite the tax structure is
comparable to many OECD countries. Martinez-Vazquez (2001) tries to explain this so-called
paradox. As he mentions, the modern tax system structure is undermined by factors as i) ad
hoc policy measures, ii) lack of an adequate ability of tax administrations to deal with a
9modern tax system, and iii) Mexican’s authority policy to keep tax efforts measured as the
ratio of revenues to GDP relatively constant, based on an agreement between the government
and the private sector.
The Latinobarómetro has integrated a similar question which allows to measure tax
morale:
On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means not at all justifiable and 10 means totally  justifiable,
how  justifiable do you believe it is to manage to avoid paying all his tax.
To compare both data sets tax morale has been coded as previously (3=highest tax morale,
0=lowest tax morale).
Table 2




(%) Mean Tax Avoidance
Argentina (Arg) 66.3 2.266 34.2
Bolivia (Bol) 49.2 2.044 34.8
Brazil (Bra) 65.1 2.165 37.8
Columbia (Col) 65.3 2.214 26.8
Costa Rica (Cos) 63.2 2.100 23.0
Chile (Chi) 60.4 2.209 22.2
Ecuador (Ecu) 52.6 1.910 43.0
El Salvador (El) 61.4 2.205 28.2
Guatemala (Gua) 78.7 2.556 17.7
Honduras (Hon) 79.6 2.519 24.9
Mexiko (Mex) 50.2 1.732 36.5
Nicaragua (Nic) 74.2 2.395 42.2
Panama (Pan) 66.7 2.228 24.7
Paraguay (Par) 68.5 2.373 34.6
Peru (Per) 53.1 2.058 33.6
Uruguay (Uru) 50.5 1.948 31.7
Venezuela (Ven) 68.8 2.310 35.0
Average 63.2 2.190 31.2
Notes: Own calculations from the Latinobarómetro. Column 2: percentage of
individuals saying that tax evasion is “never justified”. Column 3: mean of the degree
of tax morale, scale from 0 to 3, where 3 means the highest tax morale. Column 4:
percentage of individuals saying that they know or have heard that someone has
managed to avoid taxes.
The average values in Table 2 are in line with the findings obtained with the World Values
Survey. 63.2 percent of the individuals state that tax evasion in never justifiable. The mean
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value 2.190 is lower than the WVS value in the period 1995-1997. In general, Central
America seams to have a higher tax morale than South America. Guatemala has the highest
tax morale among all Latin American countries, followed by Honduras. It is interesting to
notice that Guatemala reduced the penalties in the tax reform of 1996. Before, penalty was
twice the amount of the understated taxes. The basic sanction had been reduced to 160 percent
with the possibility to even reduce this amount  if a mistake has not been discovered by the
tax administration (only 10 percent penalty, formally 100), or if taxpayers agree to settle at the
time of the initial field audit by the tax administration (20 percent, formerly 200).
Furthermore, the following ways reduce the penalty: i) taxpayers’ avowal to have evaded
before going to court reduces penalty by 40 percent, (ii)  acceptance after court but before the
final judicial determination by 80 percent. In 1990 an increase in the tax collection of 2.9
million US$ was observed (McLure and Santiago 1992). Such results indicate that there are
alternatives to a stronger deterrence (punishment) policy.
Compared to the World Values Survey the Latinobarómetro has the advantage to cover
additional tax compliance questions. We have focussed on the following variable which we
define as TAX AVOIDANCE:
Could you tell me if recently you have known someone or have heard someone you know
comment about somebody who has:  Managed to avoid paying all his tax (1=yes, 0=no).
Table 2 indicates that countries with a high tax morale has a low rate of individuals stating
that they know/heard about tax avoidance. One reason might be that individuals notice that
many individuals evade taxes which crowds out intrinsic motivation to comply with taxes.
Evasion is a signal that intrinsic motivation is not recognised. Thus, taxpayers get the feeling
that they can as well be opportunistic. The moral costs to evade taxes decrease.
Guatemala has the lowest average rates. On the other hand, in Mexico we can not only
observe a low tax morale but also a high degree of tax evasion. This result corresponds to the
findings of Casanegra de Jantscher et al. (1996), measuring the level of tax evasion in Mexico
for the VAT in 1996 as 59 percent.
To better check such a tendency we analyse if there is a significant correlation
between both variables. Figure 1 shows a strong negative correlation between the variables
(-0.412), being significant at the 0.05 level (p-value = 0.05, sign. 2-tailed).
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Figure 1
































In a next step we are going to analyse individuals’ perceptions of the reasons why people
evade taxes (see Table 3). Differences among countries and among reasons might give dues to
enhancing tax morale in a specific country.
1. Tax Burden
Taxpayers are often concerned about the burden of taxation. Over 46 percent of the
respondents in Latin America considered a high tax burden to be reason why people do not
pay taxes. Table 3 shows that tax burden (“because taxes are too high”) has the highest
percentage of all reasons mentioned. Anti-tax feelings arise if the tax burdens are seen as too
high. Especially, self-employed might feel the tax burden more as taxes become more visible
to them2. The highest values in Table 3 are observed in Argentina (65.6 percent), followed by
                                                
2
 Analysing Swiss data, Torgler (2002) found empirical evidence that individuals living in cantons with a higher
fiscal burden have a significantly lower tax morale than others.
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Uruguay (63.7 percent) and Colombia (62.8 percent). The lowest values have been obtained
from Guatemala, Venezuela and Chile.
2. Lack of Honesty/Lack of Civic Conscience
Lacking civic conscience and honesty have been mentioned very often (average percentage
44.5). Honduras (49.3), Ecuador (49.3) and Panama (41.1) have the highest values, Argentina
(17.7)  and Uruguay (20.3) the lowest. Honesty restricts the possibility set of an individual to
act illegally. Taxpayers may be aware that their evasion could damage the welfare of the
community they live in. As a consequence, evasion can produce psychological costs. People
may not be comfortable with dishonesty (see Spicer 1986). The findings of Orviska and
Hudson (2002) evaluating the British Social Attitudes Survey 1996 indicate that civic
conscience has an impact on individuals’ perceptions of whether tax evasion is right or wrong .
Furthermore, Torgler (2003) shows with the Taxpayer Opinion Survey that a higher obedience
and respect for the authority leads to a significantly higher tax morale.
3. Corruption
The presence of corruption undermines tax morale of the citizens who become frustrated. As
we can see in Table  3, on average 44.2 percent of the individuals in Latin America state that
individuals evade taxes because there is corruption. Ecuador, Mexico, and El Salvador have
the highest values, Argentina, Chile, and Peru the lowest.
There might be a crowding-out effect of morality among the tax administrators when
there is a big number of corrupt colleagues. Corruption can be reduced with fair procedures.
In the tax compliance literature, most studies incluede the assumption that tax collectors are
intrinsically motivated (see, e.g., Hindriks, Keen and Muthoo 2002). Discretionary power
over resource allocation can induce corruption. Especially in developing countries, agents as
the political elite, administration staff, and legislators have a discretionary power, because
institutions are neither credible nor working well. Over-regulation on the one side and a lack
of democratic procedures on the other hand offer a good field for illegal activities. Corruption
reduces the efficiency of allocation and produces delays in transactions to acquire additional
payments (see, e.g., Rose-Ackerman 1997, Jain 2001). In some countries tax collectors wages
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have been raised to reduce the incentive for them to engage in corruption. Interestingly, such a
strategy can also be reported from Ancient Egypt, where pharaohs increased the salary of  tax
agents (scribes) or trained special agents to check corruption in the revenue bureaus (see
Adams 1994). Hindriks et al. (1999) searched for anecdotal evidence in the literature and
report that in Taiwan 94% of interviewed tax administrators admit having let themselves be
bribed and that in India 76% of all government tax inspectors took bribes. De Soto (1989) and
his research team conducted an experiment, setting up a small garment factory in Lima, with
the aim to comply with the bureaucratic procedures and thus behave in accordance with the
law. He reports that 10 times they were asked for a bribe to speed up the process and twice it
was the only possibility to continue the experiment. It took 10 months in total to start the
business. Similar to these findings our descriptive analyses indicate that people believe
corruption to be a real  problem in Latin America.
4. Benefits from Public Spending
Taxpayers are sensitive regarding the way the government uses the taxes. There is an input-
output relation between what an individual pays with his/her taxes and what comes back from
the government. Thus, individuals’ tax compliance might be influenced by the benefits
received from the government in form of public goods compared to the price they paid for
them. Individuals might feel cheated if taxes are not spent adequately. Moral costs of evading
taxes decrease and tax morale is crowded out. The reason “because taxes are ill spent” catches
such a fiscal connection between revenues and expenditures. On average, 32.4 percent
mentioned this point. The highest value is measured in Mexico (50.3 percent), followed by El
Salvador (46.4) and Ecuador (45.8), and the lowest values are observed in Guatemala (20.1),
Chile (22.6) and Peru (23.2).
5. Fiscal Knowledge
A certain fiscal knowledge helps put into account the connection between taxes and benefits.
Better educated taxpayers might know more about tax law and fiscal connections and thus
would be in a better position to assess the degree of compliance (see Lewis 1982). However,
it should be noticed that there might possibly be people with a lower education who have
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acquired a high knowledge about taxation. This question can be measured with the following
statement: “They don’t see the point in paying taxes”. Similar to other reasons mentioned,
Mexico (49.9 percent) has the highest values followed by El Salvador (44.8) and Honduras
(41.3). On the other hand, Guatemala (15.3) and Argentina (19.7) have the lowest values. Our
data indicates that there is a significant correlation between education and the above
statement. Furthermore, only a comparatively small amount of individuals mentioned that
“because people are quick-witted and sly”, they do not pay their taxes. Interestingly and
contrary to other reasons, the highest value is observed in Venezuela.
6. Detection and Punishment
Traditionally, the tax compliance literature has strongly focused on the effects of detection
and punishment on tax evasion. However, the reason “because those that evade taxes go
unpunished” has not been mentioned very often compared to the other reasons, indicating in
Table 3 with 23.1 percent the lowest average value of all the reasons. Mexico and El Salvador
have the highest values, Peru and Columbia the lowest. Thus, this result indicates that an
increase in detection and punishment might not be the only strategy to increase tax morale and
tax compliance. Frey (1997, p. 44) points out that the “spirit of law, including specific rules,
should acknowledge the citizens’ basic good will”.
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Table 3
Reasons Why Individuals Evade Taxes
Why do people not pay their taxes? Arg Bol Braz Col Cos Chi Ecu El Gua Hon Mex Nic Pan Par Per Uru Ven Average
Because the taxes are too high 65.6 37.1 50.0 62.8 37.6 32.0 50.8 54.3 24.1 47.2 55.8 57.6 38.5 42.9 50.2 63.7 25.3 46.8
Lack of honesty 17.7 47.0 45.5 31.3 54.0 54.7 53.8 58.5 49.6 53.5 39.2 36.0 49.8 47.3 41.6 20.3 57.5 44.5
Because there is corruption 32.0 42.4 48.9 48.7 43.7 32.5 59.0 52.5 43.2 44.4 54.6 41.9 40.5 47.0 32.8 41.0 45.7 44.2
Lack of civic conscience 15.3 35.3 32.0 28.9 24.9 39.5 49.3 40.4 20.2 49.3 38.3 33.4 41.1 37.4 34.2 24.2 40.7 34.4
Because the taxes are ill-spent 26.7 40.4 29.7 40.4 27.8 22.6 45.8 46.4 20.1 35.1 50.3 33.7 27.5 29.9 23.2 25.1 26.6 32.4
They don’t see the point in paying taxes 19.7 28.5 25.9 24.4 21.2 30.3 37.8 44.8 15.3 41.3 49.9 30.4 26.9 29.9 21.4 23.4 29.2 29.4
Because nationals are quick-witted and sly 14.8 17.6 31.8 17.8 29.2 44.4 47.2 25.8 12.8 28.3 25.4 16.2 32.7 8.9 25.6 30.5 39.9 26.4
Because those that evade taxes go unpunished 26.0 23.0 24.3 16.6 19.2 18.1 31.3 36.4 13.4 24.6 36.5 21.0 18.6 19.9 14.6 26.5 22.3 23.1
Note: Percentage of Individuals that mentioned reasons why people not pay their taxes.
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1. Tax Morale and Shadow Economy
There is a lively discussion on how tax attitudes are related to individuals’ action. Is there a
correlation between tax morale and tax evasion? In a general context, social psychology
literature has intensively focused on this topic (see, e.g., Ajzen and Fishbein 1980). Lewis
(1982) points out that
“it could be that tax evasion is the only channel through which taxpayers can express their
antipathy (…) we can be confident in our general prediction that if tax attitudes become worse,
tax evasion will increase”(p. 165, 177).
The connection between attitude and behaviour is an interesting question which can be
analysed empirically. Torgler (2002a) shows in a multivariate analysis for the United States,
using the Taxpayer Opinion Survey, that tax morale and tax evasion are negatively correlated.
Furthermore, integrating European and Transition countries, Torgler (2001) observed a
significant negative correlation between tax morale and shadow economy.
The informal sector plays an important role in developing countries. Employment in
the informal sector seems to be a relevant income source for many people. Tanzi (2000)
points out that it is realistic to assume that informal activities are more important in
developing than in developed countries because it is easier to be underground as the
exemption levels for income and value added taxes are lower, social security taxes higher and
restrictions to enter formal economy activities also higher than in developed countries.
We are going to analyse whether there is a correlation between the size of shadow
economy, measured as the degree of informal employment in percent of the total population
(average 200/2001, estimated in Schneider 2002, p. 6), and  tax morale (developed from the
Latinobarómetro). Figure 2 shows that there is a strong negative correlation between both
variables (-0.511) significant at the 0.05 level (sign. 2-tailed: 0.043).
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Figure 2
Correlation between Tax Morale and the Size of Shadow Economy






























2. Multivariate Analysis (Latinobarómetro)
Taxpayers have different possibilities to express their attitudes towards a tax system.
Research commonly treats tax evasion as an important reaction to express preferences.
However, there are other possibilities as, e.g., tax avoidance. Tax avoidance and tax evasion
are often not distinguished in economic studies. We have the possibility to analyse both
components. Whereas the World Values Survey focuses on evasion, the Latinobarómetro puts
into account tax avoidance. Tax evasion might produce higher moral costs than tax avoidance,
as the latter is more broadly accepted being closer to a legal strategy to escape from tax
payments (for a survey see Torgler 2002b).
Until now, we have only analysed whether there is a correlation between the variables.
However, simple correlations do not per se tell us anything about causes and effects. In this
subsection we therefore made a multivariate regression analysis in order to get deeper
insights. First we are going to present some theoretical considerations about key determinants
that may influence tax morale and thus allow to develop hypotheses. After that, weighted
ordered probit estimations are going to be presented, using both data sets (World Values
Survey and Latinobarómetro) pooling the countries together, but differentiating between
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regions (South and Central America and Mexico). We have seen in the descriptive analysis
that Mexico is a special case, indicating a very low tax morale. Furthermore, Mexico can be
classified as an own region building the bridge between the United States and Central
America. Thus, we use a separate dummy variable for Mexico. In general, a cross-country
analysis with survey attitude questions might cause difficulties. Because of the biases
connected with cross-country comparisons, we restrict our analysis to a comparable region as
Latin America, building dummy variables to catch region differences. We are going to start
with the Latinobarómetro as this data set with 17 countries offers a broader picture of Latin
America than the World Values Survey. As dependent variable we use tax morale (scale from
0 to 3, see p. 9). Besides the control variables, in the first four estimations, we will consider
some main factors.
1. Main Variables
1.1 Avoid Paying Taxes
We have already discussed this variable in the descriptive analysis observing a significant
correlation between this variable and tax morale. We are going to check to which extent this
correlation remains negative and significant, controlling for a couple of variables.  Thus, we
would hypothesise that taxpayers who know or have heard about citizens who have managed
to avoid taxes have a lower tax morale than others. Individuals notice that many others evade
taxes intrinsic motivation to comply is crowded out.
Lewis (1982, p. 144) points out that there might be a
“tax subculture, with its own set of unwritten rules and regulations”. Thus I am more likely to
evade not only because I have friends who, I know, have got away with it (so why shouldn’t I?)
but also because evasion is ethically acceptable among my friends (…) Furthermore, ‘no friends of
mine can be criminals’ may come the reply: ‘What’s good enough for fine, upstanding citizens
like Fred Bloggs, John Doe, Donald Campbell, Herman Schmitt and Hans Anderson is good
enough for me’”.
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1.2 Trust that People Obey the Law
This variable measures the contrary effect compared to the previous one. If we believe that
most people obey the law and pay their taxes, moral costs of not being obedient increase3.
The hypothesis would be that an increase in the level of “trust that other people obey the law”
increases tax morale.
1.3 Perceived Probability of Being Caught
Traditionally, tax compliance literature stresses the relevance of deterrence factors as the
probability of being caught and fine rates. However, complying or not is not only a function
of opportunity, tax rates, and probability of detection, but depends also on social and moral
attitudes, institutions, and procedures. Especially when we analyse tax morale as dependent
variables, it can be doubted that the perceived probability of being caught has a positive effect
on tax morale4. Frey (1997) points out that a high punishment can be an indicator that the
government distrust individuals and that compliance is not honoured which may undermine
tax morale.
1.4 Trust in the President
Governments with a certain authoritarian political structure are not untypical for developing
countries. Thus, presidents have often a strong political role,  and  active democratic political
participation is often disregarded. We are going to analyse  whether trust in the president has a
positive effect on tax morale5. The government plays an important role in developing countries,
where greater difficulties must be confronted than in developed countries. Taxes can be seen as
a price paid for government’s positive actions. If taxpayers trust the president, they are more
inclined to be honest. On the other hand, if the president acts trustworthily, taxpayers might be
                                                
3
 The following question has been asked: „In general, would you say that people always obey the law, or are
there exceptions or particular occasions when people can follow their consciences even if it means breaking the
law (1= Always obey the law, 0= follow their consciences).
4
 The Latinobarómetro  has asked the respondents the following question: Would you say that it is very possible,
fairly, a little, or not at all possible that a person in our country who has committed an illegal act gets caught.
5
 Trust in government has been measured the following way: Please tell me how much confidence you have in
the president (1=not at all, 4=a lot).
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more willing to comply with the taxes. This leads to the hypothesis that a higher degree of trust
in the president leads to a higher tax morale.
2. Results
Table 4 presents the results. We have used a weighted ordered probit estimation to correct the
samples and thus to get a  reflection of the national distribution. The ordered probit models are
relevant in such an analysis insofar as they help analyse the ranking information of the scaled
dependent variable tax morale. However, as in the ordered probit estimation, the equation has a
nonlinear form, only the sign of the coefficient can be directly interpreted and not its size.
Calculating the marginal effects is therefore a method to find the quantitative effect a variable
has on tax morale (see, e.g., Frey and Stutzer 2002). Only for the extreme value “tax avoidance
is never justified” the marginal effects are presented. We can observe that South America and
Mexico have a significantly lower tax morale than Central America (reference group). Being
from South America (Mexico) rather than from Central America reduces the probability of
stating that tax avoidance is never justified by more than 10 percentage points (20 percentage
points). Knowing about individuals who avoid taxes has a significantly negative effect on tax
morale. Thus, the fist hypothesis cannot be rejected. An increase in the scale of the variable
AVOID PAYING TAXES reduces the share of individuals arguing that tax avoidance is never
justifiable by more than 6 percentage points. Furthermore, the hypotheses regarding the
variables TRUST PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW and TRUST PRESIDENT cannot be rejected
either, whereas not surprisingly PERCEPTION BEING CAUGHT is not significant showing a
coefficient with a negative sign.
Looking at the control variables we observe that all age groups from 30 to 65+ have a
significantly higher tax morale than the reference group 16-29. For example, the proportion of
persons of the age 65+ who report the highest tax morale is 12.5 percentage points higher than
for the reference age group. Marginal effects increase with an increase of the age. Furthermore
there is the tendency that married people or people who live together have a significantly
higher tax morale than singles. The proportion of self-employees, individuals salaried in a
private company and people in charge of a household who report the highest tax morale is
higher than for people salaried in a public company. A tax administration’s collecting problems
affect the monitoring of self-employed individuals, as it is very difficult and costly to gather
information about them. Thus many enterprises, especially small ones, remain invisible
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(Burges and Stern 1993). Regarding tax morale such a situation does not mean that those
individuals’ morale is lower. On contrary, they do not feel the tax burden as the government
and the administration have difficulties to capture their existence. This might also explain the
difference between people salaried in a private and in a public company.
Table 4
Determinants of Tax Morale
Weighted Ordered Probit Eq. 1  Eq. 2  Eq. 3  Eq. 4  
Variable Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg.
a) Demographic Factors
AGE 30-49 0.086*** 0.033 0.061** 0.023 0.068*** 0.026 0.070*** 0.026
AGE 50-64 0.167*** 0.063 0.129*** 0.048 0.148*** 0.056 0.159*** 0.060
AGE 65+ 0.332*** 0.125 0.264*** 0.099 0.334*** 0.126 0.321*** 0.121
FEMALE 0.007 0.003 0.036 0.013 0.022 0.008 0.021 0.008
EDUCATION 0.005** 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.004* 0.002 0.004 0.001
b) Marital Status
MARRIED/LIVING TOGETHER 0.047* 0.018 0.045* 0.017 0.043* 0.016 0.039 0.015
DIVORCED/WIDOWED -0.033 -0.012 -0.052 -0.020 -0.040 -0.015 -0.044 -0.017
c) Employment Status
SELFEMPLOYED 0.032 0.012 0.063* 0.024* 0.050 0.019 0.056 0.021
SALARIED IN A PRIVATE COMPANY 0.065* 0.025 0.072* 0.027* 0.070* 0.026 0.073** 0.028
UNEMPLOYED -0.048 -0.018 -0.027 -0.010 -0.039 -0.015 -0.030 -0.011
RETIRED 0.010 0.004 0.058 0.022 0.006 0.002 0.000 0.000
IN CHARGE OF HOUSEHOLD 0.117** 0.044 0.109*** 0.041*** 0.121*** 0.046 0.133*** 0.050
STUDENT 0.037 0.014 0.041 0.016 0.036 0.014 0.049 0.018
f) Regional Variable
SOUTH AMERICA -0.300*** -0.113 -0.310*** -0.117 -0.289*** -0.109 -0.292*** -0.110
MEXICO -0.626*** -0.236 -0.631*** -0.237 -0.639*** -0.241 -0.637*** -0.200
g) Further Variables
AVOID PAYING TAXES -0.172*** -0.065
TRUST PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 0.227*** 0.086
PERCEPTION BEING CAUGHT -0.002 -0.001
TRUST PRESIDENT 0.021*** 0.008
Observations 14823 14409 15274 15282
Prob(LM-statistic) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Notes: Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale. In the reference group are AGE 16-29, MALE, SINGLE,
SALARIED IN A PUBLIC COMPANY, CENTRAL AMERICA. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.  Marginal effect = highest tax morale score (3).
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It might be interesting to integrate a proxy for income into the estimations. The
Latinobarómetro has no specific information about the income of the subjects. Thus, the
following proxies are integrated into further equations: OWN HOUSE, SOCIO-ECONOMIC
STATUS6 and FORTUNE7. Interestingly, all coefficients are not significant, showing low
marginal effects. The coefficients for the regional variables remain significant.
Table 5
Tax Morale and Status
       
weighted ordered probit Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg.
Effect Effect Effect
 Eq. 5  Eq. 6  Eq. 7  
a) Demographic Variables included included included
b) Marital Status included included included
c) Employment Status included included included
d) Regional Variable
SOUTH AMERICA -0.297*** -0.112 -0.283*** -0.107 -0.321*** -0.121
MEXICO -0.626*** -0.236 -0.624*** -0.236 -0.650*** -0.245
e) Fortune and Status
OWN HOUSE 0.024 0.009
SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS -0.007 -0.003
FORTUNE 0.005 0.002
Number of observations 15371 14987 14567
Prob(LM-statistic) 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Notes: Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale. In the reference group are AGE 16-29, MALE,
SINGLE, SALARIED IN A PUBLIC COMPANY, CENTRAL AMERICA. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p <
0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  Marginal effect = highest tax morale score (3).
3. Multivariate Analysis (World Values Survey)
In a second step we are going to evaluate World Values Survey (WVS) data. The data set
covers a wider range of questions on attitudes issues and socio-economic characteristics. We
                                                
6
 Socio-economic status (4=very good, 1=very bad).
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are going to evaluate the wave 1995-1997, covering the highest amount of countries (see
Table 1, p. 8). Similarly, we are going to build regional dummy variables. The WVS has the
disadvantage that Central America has not been covered sufficiently. Thus, instead of
differentiating between South and Central America, we build additional dummies for Mexico
and the Dominican Republic (Caribbean area). Table 6 indicates in line with the
Latinobarómetro findings that Mexico has a significantly lower tax morale compared to the
reference group (other Latino American countries).
Instead of trust in the present we use satisfaction with officials. This allows to check
the robustness of the trust variable expanding it to other state agents. The coefficient is highly
significant and the marginal effects show that an increase in the level of satisfaction by one
unit raises the share of individuals stating that tax morale is never justifiable by 1 percentage
point.
We have obtained comparable results regarding the control variables. A higher age has
a positive effect on tax morale. Furthermore, married people (females) have a higher tax
morale than singles (males). The coefficient of the variable EDUCATION has now a negative
sign. However, the significant effect on tax morale is not robust throughout all equations. We
also controlled for the economic situation of the individuals. The results show the tendency
that the lowest group (reference group) has a higher tax morale than the groups with a better
economic situation. However, only the coefficient for the variable LOWER MIDDLE CLASS
indicates a significant difference to the variable LOWER CLASS. We also checked if people
with a stronger religiosity have a higher tax morale8. Religiosity might act as a restriction to
acting illegally. According to Hirschi and Stark (1969) religion might inhibit illegal behaviour
because religion is a sanctioning system that legitimises and reinforces social values.
Empirical studies have shown that states and counties with higher rates of religious
memberships have significantly less violent and non-violent crime (see, e.g., Hull 2000, Hull
and Bold 1989 and Lipford, McCormick and Tollison 1993). Table 6 shows a positive
correlation between tax morale and religiosity.
                                                                                                                                                        
7
 As a proxy for FORTUNE we take the aggregated  sum of  the following factors:  colour tv, freezer, computer,
washing machine, phone, car, second house, drinking water, sewage system (value 0 to 9).
8
 We have developed a religiosity variable from the following question in the WVS: Independently of whether




Determinants of Tax Morale (1995-1997)
Weighted Ordered Probit Eq. 1  Eq. 2  Eq. 3  Eq. 4  
Variables Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg.
a) Demographic Factors
AGE 30-49 0.090*** 0.033 0.086*** 0.032 0.101*** 0.037 0.086*** 0.032
AGE 50-64 0.304*** 0.112 0.298*** 0.109 0.284*** 0.105 0.281*** 0.104
AGE 65+ 0.509*** 0.187 0.500*** 0.183 0.501*** 0.184 0.441*** 0.162
FEMALE 0.109*** 0.040 0.101*** 0.037 0.091*** 0.034 0.109*** 0.040
EDUCATION -0.011 -0.004 -0.018*** -0.007 -0.014** -0.005 -0.006 -0.002
b) Marital Status
MARRIED 0.095*** 0.035 0.081** 0.030 0.090*** 0.033 0.076** 0.028
LIVING TOGETHER -0.006 -0.002 -0.008 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.009 -0.003
DIVORCED -0.067 -0.025 -0.042 -0.015 -0.042 -0.016 -0.045 -0.017
SEPARATED 0.017 0.006 0.019 0.007 -0.008 -0.003 0.034 0.013
WIDOWED 0.158** 0.058 0.116 0.043 0.139* 0.051 0.169** 0.062
c) Employment Status
PART TIME EMPLOYED 0.013 0.005 0.038 0.014 0.030 0.011 0.018 0.007
SELFEMPLOYED 0.061 0.023 0.060 0.022 0.056 0.021 0.056 0.021
UNEMPLOYED 0.015 0.005 0.009 0.003 0.027 0.010 0.021 0.008
AT HOME -0.034 -0.012 -0.008 -0.003 -0.019 -0.007 -0.022 -0.008
STUDENT 0.120*** 0.044 0.116*** 0.043 0.134*** 0.049 0.106*** 0.039
RETIRED 0.008 0.003 0.041 0.015 0.056 0.021 0.049 0.018
OTHER 0.021 0.008 -0.008 -0.003 0.015 0.006 -0.009 -0.003
d) Economic Situation
UPPER CLASS -0.027 -0.010 -0.072 -0.027 -0.015 -0.006 -0.037 -0.014
UPPER MIDDLE CLASS -0.014 -0.005 -0.050 -0.019 -0.024 -0.009 -0.012 -0.004
LOWER MIDDLE CLASS -0.098** -0.036 -0.135*** -0.050 -0.115** -0.042 -0.079* -0.029
WORKING CLASS -0.019 -0.007 -0.061 -0.022 -0.043 -0.016 -0.022 -0.008
e) Religiosity
RELIGIOUS 0.092*** 0.034 0.094*** 0.034 0.091*** 0.033 0.060*** 0.022
f) Regional Variable
MEXICO -0.274*** -0.101 -0.239*** -0.088 -0.264*** -0.097 -0.285*** -0.105
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 0.313*** 0.115 0.239*** 0.088 0.269*** 0.099 0.280*** 0.103
g) Further Variables
SATISFACTION WITH NATIONAL 0.028*** 0.010
OFFICERS
PRO DEMOCRACY 1 0.200*** 0.073
PRO DEMOCRACY 2 0.123*** 0.045
PRIDE 0.249*** 0.092
Observations 7422 7233 7146 7483
Prob(LM-statistic) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Notes: Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale. In the reference group are AGE 16-29, MALE, SINGLE, FULL
TIME EMPLOYED, LOWER CLASS, SOUTH AMERICA. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01.  Marginal effect = highest tax morale score (3).
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Political participation is a social innovation for Latin America and produces beneficial effects.
In the last decades we observe a strengthening of democracy in some Latin American
countries, as, e.g., in Chile, Mexico and Argentina. Democracy offers citizens the possibility to
express their preferences. A more active role helps citizens to better monitor and control
politicians and thus to reduce the asymmetry of information between them and their agents
(government), which reduces the discretionary power. This might influence citizens’ tax
morale. Thus we would hypothesise that a stronger pro democratic attitude has a positive effect
on tax morale. We have built variables that measure individuals’ support for democratic
government (PRO DEMOCRACY 19 and PRO DEMOCRACY 210). Table 6 indicates that pro
democratic attitudes have a highly significant positive effect on tax morale. An increase in the
pro democracy scale by one unit in both cases raises the proportion of persons indicating the
highest tax morale by 7.3 (4.5) percentage points. We also analyse the effect of pride on tax
morale. Being proud of her/his country enhances the identification with the state. It might give
a basis to behave co-operatively and thus to find it important to pay the taxes. Thus, the
expected sign for the variable PRIDE is positive. Table 6 indicates that the hypothesis cannot
be rejected. We find a positive correlation between pride and tax morale. An increase in pride
by one unit raises the share of persons arguing that tax morale is never justifiable by 9.2
percentage points.
We also explore the effects of satisfaction variables on tax morale. We start with the
variable FINANCIAL SATISFACTION which is more strongly related to tax payments. If the
financial situation in a household is poor, the tax payments might be seen as a hard restriction
in their possibility set, which might reduce tax honesty.  To get a broader view, we include the
variables SATISFACTION11 and HAPPINESS12. Table 7 presents the results. All three
variables significantly affect tax morale in a positive way. Interestingly, the variable
HAPPINESS has the highest marginal effects.
                                                
9
 The question is : “Would you say that having a democratic political system is a very good (4), fairly good (3),
fairly bad (2) or very bad (1) way of governing this country” (scale 1 to 4).
10
 “Democracy  may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government” (4=strongly agree,
1=strongly disagree).
11
 All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? (scale 1 = dissatisfied to
10=satisfied).
12




Tax Morale and Satisfaction
         
weighted ordered probit Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg. Coeff. Marg.
Effect Effect Effect Effect
 Eq. 5  Eq. 6  Eq. 7  Eq. 8  
a) Demographic Variables included included included included
b) Marital Status included included included included
c) Employment Status included included included included
d) Economic Situation included included included
INCOME 0.052*** 0.019
e) Religiosity included included included included
f) Regional Variable
MEXICO -0.302*** -0.111 -0.306*** -0.112 -0.256*** -0.094 -0.292*** -0.108
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 0.289*** 0.106 0.277*** 0.102 0.299*** 0.110 0.289*** 0.107
g) Satisfaction
FINANCIAL SATISFACTION 0.018*** 0.006
SATISFACTION 0.038*** 0.014
HAPINESS 0.199*** 0.073
Number of observations 7572 7580 7572 7052
Prob(LM-statistic) 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Notes: Dependent variable: tax morale on a four point scale. In the reference group are AGE 16-29, MALE, SINGLE, FULL TIME
EMPLOYED, LOWER CLASS, SOUTH AMERICA. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Marginal effect = highest tax morale score (3).
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
We find a couple of publications about the informal sector in Latin America, but hardly any
study that has analysed tax morale. Most of the empirical evidence  is centered on the USA,
evaluating, e.g., the TCMP program or amnesty data. Thus, it is difficult to know to which
extent findings from the United States can be transferred to other countries. Furthermore,
audit and amnesty data have a selection bias as only specific individuals participate in an
amnesty and not all individuals (especially tax evaders) are measured with audit data. Our
data sets have also the advantage that they include a broad variety of socio-economic data.
Working with two data sets (Latinobarómetro and World Values Survey) allows to get a
robust picture about tax morale in Latin America. These two data sets offer the possibility to
do a more refined study covering more than one year.
Our findings indicate that there is a significant correlation between tax morale and the
size of shadow economy. Furthermore, people who said they knew/have heard about practised
tax avoidance have a significantly lower tax morale than others. Looking at individuals’
perceptions of reasons for tax evasion we found that the tax burden, the lack of honesty, and
corruption are seen as the main factors. A tax system must be fair in the view of the taxpayers.
If a taxpayer feels that she/he is in a sort of unfair contract she/he will probably be less likely
to comply. As Smith (1992) argues, cycles of antagonism between the tax administration and
the taxpayer might begin to break with a positive concession by the administrator. Taxpayers
are more inclined to comply to the law if the exchange between the paid tax and the
performed government services are found to be equitable.
In our multivariate analysis we use entire pooled samples to check the robustness of
the  findings. We could observe a significantly lower tax morale in South America/Mexico
than in Central America/Caribbean Area. Especially Mexico has a very low tax morale.
In general, the results indicate that there are alternative tax policy strategies to those
assuming that people are knaves who must be controlled to reduce their self-interested
behaviour and thus tax evasion. It is not necessary to develop a constitution designed for
knaves. Tax law should consider the “spirit of trust”, i.e., should include specific rules as,
self-declaration, which gives taxpayers more scope of their own and supports trustfulness as a
motivation to pay taxes. Trust in the president and the officials, the belief that other
individuals obey the law and a pro democratic attitude have a significant positive effect on tax
morale. The governments and the tax administration have to create confidence in their
credibility and their capacity to deliver promised returns for taxes. The relationship between
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taxpayers and tax authorities, seen as a relational contract or psychological contract, involves
strong emotional ties and loyalties. Such a psychological tax contract can be maintained by
positive actions, based on trust (see Feld and Frey 2002b). If such rules yield good results and
taxpayers make their decisions to comply with taxation according to past experiences, social
capital associated with paying taxes can be created or maintained. Such a social capital stock





country years    
Argentina 1984 (WVS) 1991 (WVS) 1995 (WVS) 1998 (LatBa)
Bolivia 1998 (LatBa)
Brazil 1991-1992 (WVS) 1997 (WVS) 1998 (LatBa)
Columbia 1997-1998 (WVS) 1998 (LatBa)
Costa Rica 1998 (LatBa)
Chile 1990 (WVS) 1996 (WVS) 1998 (LatBa)
Dominican Republic 1996 (WVS)
Ecuador 1998 (LatBa)
El Salvador 1998 (LatBa)
Guatemala 1998 (LatBa)
Honduras 1998 (LatBa)




Peru 1996 (WVS) 1998 (LatBa)
Puerto Rico 1995 (WVS)
Uruguay 1996 (WVS) 1998 (LatBa)
Venezuela   1996 (WVS) 1998 (LatBa)
Notes: WVS: World Values Survey, LatBa: Latinobarómetro.
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